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THE BACKGROUND TO THE CASE 
 
The decision of the Court of Appeal in Thorner v Major1 briefly 
constructed an almost impossible strait-jacket around potential claimants 
under proprietary estoppel, reminiscent of the way the strict requirements 
under the Willmot v Barber2 probanda had earlier limited such claims3. The 
Court of Appeal held in Thorner v Major4 that an assurance of rights had to 
be clear and unequivocal in order to give rise to property rights and on the 
facts of this case the assurances had been too vague to give rise to such rights. 
In an area of law based on informality and often vague promises it appeared 
that the law was now in retrenchment and was reasserting the need for very 
strict limitations on the circumstances in which property claims under 
proprietary estoppel could arise. As Brian Sloan in his case comment stated: 
 
“In Thorner, the Court of Appeal tightened the requirements for a 
relevant representation, thereby shifting that balance in favour of the 
alleged representor and his or her estate.”  
 
Other writers went as far as to suggest that as a result of this decision and 
also the House of Lords decision in Yeoman’s Row Management v Cobbe 5 
* LLB, LLM (Lond), Barrister, Reader in Law, University of Buckingham. 
1 [2008] EWCA Civ 732. 
2 (1880) 15 Ch D 96. 
3 See Gray and Gray Elements of Land Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 5th edn, 
2009) p 1207 where the five Willmot v Barber probanda are described as “a strait-
jacket imposed on the development of proprietary estoppel.”   
4 Above n 1. 
5 [2008] UKHL 55. 
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there would be a dramatic curtailment of the scope of the doctrine.6 However, 
within a matter of months the decision of the High Court had been reasserted 
and the House of Lords upheld the claim of David Thorner, based not on an 
express promise of property rights but on an indirect expression of intention 
that the claimant would inherit the property and, more significantly took into 
account the surrounding pattern of conduct.  
This article examines the basis on which a claimant can make a successful 
claim based on proprietary estoppel today and considers whether the courts 
now regard the House of Lord’s decision in Thorner v Major7 as having 
introduced a lower standard for an assurance in a proprietary estoppel claim 
both in respect to the promise of rights made and also as to the identification 
of the property concerned. It will also consider the wider issue of the 
difficulties presented to the courts where an assurance is made which relates 
to future testamentary rights. 
 
THE FACTS OF THE CASE 
 
David Thorner was a farmer in Somerset. For nearly thirty years, from 
1976 he worked without pay on the farm of his father’s cousin, Peter Thorner 
and contended that he had been encouraged by Peter Thorner for a period of 
fifteen years before he died to believe that he would inherit Peter’s farm. He 
maintained that in reliance on this encouragement he had continued to work 
without pay. Peter Thorner had made a valid will under which he left the farm 
to David but had revoked it prior to his death and died intestate. The 
revocation of the will was unconnected with his relationship with David. They 
had not fallen out and David had continued to work for Peter until he died in 
2005. Both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords held quite correctly 
that the existence of an earlier but unenforceable will was irrelevant to the 
proof of a claim under estoppel. For David to make a successful claim against 
those who had rights in the farm under the intestacy rules,8 he had to rely on 
proprietary estoppel and to prove the three established elements namely, an 
assurance, reliance on that assurance and detriment.9 Although Deputy Judge 
6 See generally B McFarlane and A Robertson “The Death of Proprietary Estoppel” 
[2008] Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 449.  
7 [2009] 1 WLR 776.  
8 Under the Administration of Estates Act 1925, Intestate Estates Act 1952 and the 
Family Provision (Intestate Succession) Order 1987 the estate of Peter Thorner would 
pass to his next of kin who were his siblings, two sisters and also a niece so David 
Thorner would inherit nothing. 
9 As established in Taylor Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd [1982] 
QB 133. 
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John Randall QC had at first instance found evidence of an assurance10 in 
favour of David Thorner, the Court of Appeal had greater difficulty.11 Peter 
Thorner had been a man of very few words and there was little evidence that 
he had ever discussed the farm and who would own it after his death in any 
detail with David Thorner. David’s case principally relied on a conversation 
in 1990, when Peter had handed over an insurance policy bonus notice with 
the words “that’s for my death duties” and also on inferences to be derived 
from the circumstances of their relationship over thirty years. The Court of 
Appeal found against David Thorner on two main grounds. 
Firstly, the court considered to what extent an assurance had to be clear 
and unequivocal in order to give rise to rights. There had been some 
difference of opinion prior to Thorner as to precisely how clear the assurance 
had to be in proprietary estoppel. Although in previous cases such as Re 
Basham12and Jennings v Rice13 the court had been prepared to uphold claims 
based on fairly loose assurances such as “all this will be yours one day”14 the 
Court of Appeal in this case were more reluctant to uphold a claim on such a 
loosely worded assurance of rights. Lord Justice Lloyd suggested that the 
conduct of Peter Thorner in this case could have been consistent with a 
current intention to leave David the farm but was not a definite assurance of 
future rights on which the court held proprietary estoppel rests. He quoted 
from J.T. Development Ltd v Quinn15 where Lord Justice Ralph Gibson said  
 
“The law requires that a representation, if it is to provide the basis of 
an estoppel, be clear and unequivocal and that it be intended to be 
relied upon.”16
  
Lord Justice Lloyd concluded that although the law did not lay down any 
precise form for an assurance or promise there was a general requirement that 
it must be clear and unequivocal. He suggested further that even where the 
assurance was based on conduct alone it too must be clear and unequivocal.17
Secondly, the Court of Appeal revisited the difficult issue of the 
testamentary promise. For many years it was assumed that such promises 
could not be relied on in proprietary estoppel because they stifled the 
10 Thorner v Curtis [2007] EWHC 2422 (Ch). 
11 Above n 1. 
12 [1986] 1 WLR 1498. 
13 [2003] 1 P & CR 100. 
14 Ibid at para 17. 
15 [1991] 2 EGLR 257.  
16 Ibid at 261. 
17 Above n 1 at para 54. 
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important principle of testamentary freedom. Even as recently as 199818 a 
claim based on the promise of property rights under a will was rejected by 
Judge Weeks Q.C. on the basis that the deceased had never given an 
assurance that she would never change her will. Judge Weeks took the view 
that in such cases the claimant must also establish that the deceased had 
encouraged a belief that he/she would not revoke her will and the claimant 
had also relied on that encouragement. This view was criticised widely19 and 
the apparent limit it placed on many claims under proprietary estoppel. The 
point was addressed two years later in Gillett v Holt20 where Lord Justice 
Robert Walker held that an assurance of property rights under a will can be 
binding on the future testator so that the assurance will crystallise into a 
binding assurance. The point when the assurance or promise will crystallise 
into rights occurs when the promisee acts in reliance on that promise to 
his/her detriment. In Gillett, the promisor was still alive so it was significant 
that the court upheld the claim of the promisee against the promisor’s estate.21 
Lord Justice Lloyd considered this judgment and others and concluded: 
 
“while there is no special rule as to the form or nature of the promise, 
representation or assurance which is capable of providing the basis of 
a proprietary estoppel case as regards a claim against a deceased’s 
estate, it seems to me that the general requirements that there must be 
a clear and unequivocal representation, and that it must be intended to 
be relied on, or at the very least that it must be reasonably taken as 
intended to be relied on, are of no less importance in this type of case 
than others, and they must be applied with care.”22
  
He pointed out that in the case of statements made about testamentary 
intentions may not necessarily be intended to be taken as promises of future 
property rights.23 He concluded that where assurances of future property 
rights under a will, proprietary estoppel cannot be based on conduct or 
standing by or indeed anything less than a clear promise or assurance that the 
claimant will inherit. 
18 Taylor v Dickens [1998] 1 FLR 806. 
19 See generally M P Thompson “Emasculating estoppel” [1998] Conveyancer and 
Property Lawyer 210. 
20 [2001] Ch 210. 
21 See Martin Dixon “Estoppel and Testamentary Freedom” [2008] Conveyancer and 
Property Lawyer 65 where he reflects that in this context estoppel becomes “a very 
sharp sword indeed.” 
22 Above n 1 at para 54. 
23 Ibid.  
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Within a matter of months the House of Lords unanimously reversed the 
decision of the Court of Appeal and upheld the claim. The House of Lords 
revisited the nature of the assurances made. The real difficulty presented to 
the court was the lack of a definitive moment when the property rights arose 
and also the issue of whether it was material whether or not Peter Thorner 
believed that David would rely on the assurance given. Although there was no 
definitive assurance made by Peter, the judges were persuaded that the pattern 
of conduct after the indirect assurance as well as the context in which it was 
said was as important in proving a clear and unequivocal express assurance of 
rights. As stated by Lord Hoffman “past events can provide context and 
background for the interpretation of subsequent events and subsequent events 
throw retrospective light upon the meaning of past events”24. He drew a 
wonderfully evocative comparison with the owl of Minerva which he said 
“will only spread its wings with the falling of dusk.”25 The reference was later 
embraced by Lord Neuberger in his critical appraisal of Thorner v Major and 
Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management given in a lecture in June 2009.26 Lord 
Neuberger reiterated Lord Hoffman’s view that the meaning of words and 
judgment should always be assessed in their factual context. He commented 
“the meaning of words and actions was to be assessed within their factual 
context, which assessment the judge had conscientiously and carefully carried 
out.”27 Lord Neuberger had also heard the case of Thorner and he stated in his 
judgment as follows: 
 
“It would be wrong to be unrealistically rigorous when applying the 
‘clear and unambiguous’ test. The court should not search for 
ambiguity or uncertainty, but should assess the question of clarity and 
certainty practically and sensibly, as well as contextually.”28  
 
He continued by stating that: 
 
“…it is sufficient for the person invoking the estoppel to establish that 
he reasonably understood the statement or action to be an assurance 
on which he could rely.”29
 
24 Above n 8 at 780 para 8. 
25 Ibid. 
26 “The stuffing of Minerva’s owl? Taxonomy and Taxidermy in Equity” [2009] 
Cambridge Law Journal  537 at 544. The second memorial lecture for Jonathan 
Brock QC at the Inner Temple Hall London on June 9 2009. 
27 Ibid at 540. 
28 Above n 8 at 801 para 85.  
29 Ibid. 
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Their Lordships, in particular Lord Neuberger, also considered at some 
length the uncertainty as to the extent of the property Peter promised to David. 
Over the years the size of the farm had varied as parts had been sold and parts 
had been purchased. The Court of Appeal found that this also undermined the 
clarity of the assurance made. Lord Neuberger commented as follows: 
 
“It would represent a regrettable and substantial emasculation of the 
beneficial principle of proprietary estoppel if it were artificially 
fettered so as to require the precise extent of the property the subject 
of the alleged estoppel to be strictly defined in every case.”30
 
Their Lordships concluded that the identification of the property must be 
sufficient to give the promise the clear and unequivocal character required to 
found estoppel but it need not be defined with precision. This is a very 
important issue since there may be a considerable, lapse in time between the 
representation and the moment when the equity is satisfied. In the context of 
property such as a farm there may be many changes from year to year as the 
exact extent of the farm fluctuates. 
The claim of Peter Thorner clearly engendered support from the House of 
Lords and it is hard to criticise a claimant who on the evidence had often 
worked tirelessly for a relative with virtually no pay apart from pocket money. 
However this decision may be said to have highlighted the inherent problems 
in proprietary estoppel rather than providing a coherent solution.31  The effect 
of this decision will become increasingly clear as its impact is seen on 
subsequent decisions. 
 
SUBSEQUENT CASES 
 
Several cases on proprietary estoppel have been decided in the light of the 
decision in Thorner v Major. Although these are relatively few in number and 
even fewer are based on facts which are similar to Thorner the following 
analysis of these cases may show whether there has been a sea-change in the 
30 Ibid. 
31 See “Proprietary Estoppel: a Return to Principle?” [2009] Conveyancer and 
Property Lawyer 260 at 267 where Dixon comments “that Thorner is important is 
undeniable, but perhaps also for what it omits to discuss, as much as for what it does 
decide.” See also “Apocalypse averted: Proprietary estoppel in the House of Lords” 
[2009] Law Quarterly Review 535 at 542 where McFarlane and Robertson comment 
“In the longer term, the decision in Thorner v Major may force a re-examination of 
some of the more tricky questions relating to proprietary estoppel, such as the extent 
of the rights it gives rise to and the scope of its application beyond cases involving 
land.” 
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court’s approach to some key issues in proprietary estoppel such as proof of 
both an assurance and the extent of property in such cases.  
One of the first cases to be heard was Stallion v Albert Stallion Holdings32
It is difficult to draw more than a passing inference from the approach of the 
judge in this case33 since the facts of Stallion and Thorner were very different. 
However the relevance lies in the fact that the nature of the assurances made 
in Stallion were in dispute in the same way as the assurance in Thorner.  The 
claim was made by Porntip Stallion against Albert Stallion, the deceased. She 
was his third wife and had been married to him for six years.  The marriage 
had ended when the deceased had asked the claimant to divorce him in order 
for him to marry his fourth wife Lilibeth. She had agreed but on certain terms 
which were agreed between them both orally and in the form of two separate 
written agreements. One of the agreed terms was that she would be able to 
live rent-free for the rest of her life in property, which had once constituted 
their matrimonial home and to be granted a five year contract of employment 
with an agreed salary and to be given a fully serviced car in lieu of an order 
for ancillary relief. On his death the deceased left his entire estate to Lilibeth. 
On being asked to leave the premises Porntip had claimed that she had a life-
time right to occupy the premises based on proprietary estoppel. The judge 
referred to Lord Scott’s judgment in Thorner 34 accepting that in this case 
only those representations which were clear and unequivocal could be binding 
and on that basis the judge upheld an oral agreement which allowed the 
claimant to live rent-free in the premises for the rest of her life. It is difficult 
to draw much from this judgment since in this case both representations had 
been written down and the oral representations had been made in front of 
witnesses. However it is worth noting that the judge placed great weight on 
the nature of the representation and took pains within her judgment to justify 
why she found in favour of the claimant rejecting the agreement of June 30 as 
follows “I would have found that the representation contained in the 30 June 
Agreement was insufficiently clear in relation to the extent of the premises 
over which Porntip was intended to have exclusive occupation and the date 
from which it was intended to take effect, to be effective.”35
In MacDonald v Frost,36 another first instance decision, based on 
proprietary estoppel a claim was made by two daughters Averil Macdonald 
and Deborah Bannigan against their deceased father’s estate. Their father had 
made a will under which they and their children had been left nothing. They 
argued that their father had given them both assurances of property rights 
32 [2009] EWHC 1950. 
33 Sarah Asplin QC sitting as a High Court Judge. 
34 Above n 28 at para 123. 
35Above  n 23 at para 125. 
36 [2009] EWHC 2276 (Ch). 
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during his lifetime which would be binding on the estate. As in Thorner 
everything hinged on the nature of the assurance made, the nature of the 
property over which the assurance had been made and whether or not the 
assurances were binding. The daughters argued that their father had made a 
clear and unequivocal promise with his first wife and their mother that 
“whatever happened, the estate of the survivor would pass to their daughters 
in equal shares” and in reliance on that promise they both supported their 
father financially until his death some twenty years later. The father remarried 
seven years after the death of the daughters’ mother and he had made a new 
will under which the two daughters did not take any benefit. The background 
to the case suggests that the daughters and the second wife were not on good 
terms although it was clearly stated in court that the daughters had no wish to 
deprive the second wife of her home but merely to claim the residuary estate 
after her death based on the earlier promise made by their father. Such cases 
are the very stuff of claims in proprietary estoppel. There was no doubt that 
they had acted to their detriment by supporting their parents financially for 
such a long period of time but as in Stallion the judge37 was at pains to point 
out that “the crucial question that she had to decide was whether there was an 
assurance or series of assurances that was sufficiently clear and unequivocal 
to give rise to a proprietary estoppel, bearing in mind the guidance in 
Thorner38.” The father had made a payment of £20,000 to one daughter and 
discounted the price of property he owned on sale to the other daughter. The 
judge could find no assurances or promises of property rights after their father 
had remarried. The judge continued “if and insofar as the monthly instalments 
were also made by Joe’s daughters in the expectation of receiving the balance 
of the inheritance, that expectation was not fostered by any specific promises 
made to Averil and Deborah.”39 So in spite of what the judge referred to as “a 
tacit assumption that Averil and Deborah would inherit their parent’s estate in 
equal shares” 40 their claim failed. This decision seems to lean against any 
relaxation in what must be proved for an assurance to be binding. The judge 
said she had sympathy with the claimants but “it is not the function of the 
court to re-write Joe’s will so as to produce a fairer distribution of his estate 
than he himself intended.”41 Such words must suggest that there is no 
particular relaxation in the judicial approach to proof of an assurance post-
Thorner indeed if anything it could suggest a greater need for clarity. The 
37 Geraldine Andrews QC (sitting as a Judge of the High Court). 
38 n 37 at para 21. 
39 n 37 para 128. 
40 Ibid. 
41 n 37 para 130. 
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clear message from this judgment echoed Lord Hoffman’s view that context is 
everything.42  
On the same day as the decision in MacDonald v Frost another 
proprietary estoppel judgement at first instance was given. The claimant’s 
case in Gill v Woodall43 was complicated by disputes over the validity of the 
will and the possibility of undue influence. The judge44 found the will to have 
been validly executed but since there was evidence of undue influence he duly 
set it aside and the issues of proprietary estoppel took a lesser role in the case. 
However the judge reviewed the various judgments in the House of Lords as 
to what constitutes an assurance concluding inter alia “that an assurance may 
be sufficient to found an estoppel even if it is not made expressly; it can be 
made in oblique and allusive terms; it may be subject to unspoken and ill 
defined qualifications.”45 He also concluded that “this is an issue of fact 
heavily dependant upon the context in which the assurance or assurances was 
or were made (including the characteristics of the protagonists, the 
relationship between them and whether assurances were repeated and formed 
part of a pattern) on which evidence of the parties’ subjective understanding 
of what they were agreeing is admissible.”46 The claimant successfully 
contested the will of her deceased mother made in favour of a Charity, the 
RSPCA. In addition to the claim of undue influence she also relied on a 
number of assurances made to her over a period of time, sometimes in front of 
witnesses, such as her father’s conversations with a number of people that he 
wished the farm to be kept for the “next generation” a comment by her father 
to friends about the farm “after all it’ll be hers one day” and advice from her 
mother that she should keep a copy of some plans of drains about the farm as 
they would be of use to her sometime in the future. Cumulatively these 
promises were sufficient to persuade the judge that there had been an 
assurance of property rights which would have been binding on the court even 
if the will had not been set aside. There was much here to echo the facts of 
Thorner and Gillett v Holt.  
Cook v Thomas47 was one of the first cases to be heard by the Court of 
Appeal since Thorner and perhaps gives the best indication of all as to the 
impact of the case on estoppel claims. As Lord Justice Lloyd aptly 
commented in the opening words of his judgment “the litigation arises from a 
42 n 37 para 21 “I have to consider and evaluate the evidence of Averil and Deborah 
against the background of any relevant contemporaneous documents, the behaviour of 
all main protagonists, and the underlying probabilities.” Geraldine Andrews QC. 
43 [2009] EWCA 834. 
44 Mr James Allen QC sitting a Deputy Judge of the High Court. 
45 Above n 44 para 518. 
46 Ibid. 
47 [2010] EWCA Civ 227. 
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most unfortunate and regrettable dispute.”48 The claimant Mrs Thomas was 
the only daughter of an elderly widow. The parties had fallen out and the 
mother sought to evict her daughter and husband from the property, a farm 
and smallholding in Ross-on-Wye. The daughter relied on certain promises 
made to her over a period of time and thereby claimed rights arising under 
proprietary estoppel as well as rights under a constructive trust and an 
alternative claim based on unjust enrichment. None of these succeeded. The 
daughter had been on poor terms with her parents after her marriage to the 
second defendant, her husband. However after her father died the daughter 
and her husband had moved back to the farm and lived in a mobile home in 
the grounds of her mother’s farm paying a small ground rent to her mother. 
Mrs Thomas contended that over a period of five years her mother had led her 
to believe that she would gain rights in the property both expressly and 
impliedly by her conduct. Then the parties fell out again and eventually the 
mother sought to evict them and this was the basis of the claim before the 
court. There was evidence that the mother had invited them to live in the 
property when, after a storm, their mobile home became uninhabitable but she 
contended that this was because she felt sorry for them On the other hand the 
claimant and her husband contended that she had told them that if they carried 
out certain repairs to the property “then they could move in the farmhouse and 
occupy that part of it from then on as long as they needed to while she was 
alive, instead of waiting until her death.”49 Much of the Defendants case was 
based on the findings of fact made by the judge at first instance. Lord Justice 
Lloyd once more gave the leading judgment in this case having given the 
leading judgment in Thorner v Major in the Court of Appeal. His decision 
relied in part on rules of evidence and he used a range of cases where the 
credibility of witnesses had been at issue.50 Of course this decision differs 
from the vast majority of proprietary estoppel cases because in this case the 
assurer was able to come to court to give evidence about what had been said. 
The mother, in spite of her age, was quite clear in her evidence that she had 
not given the daughter and her husband any assurances about property rights 
and had merely helped them out in an emergency when the roof of their 
mobile home had blown off and they had nowhere to live. It is rare in estoppel 
cases for the assurer to be able to give evidence as shown above in Thorner v 
Major, Stallion v Albert Stallion Holdings, MacDonald v Frost and Gill v 
Woodall. Where the assurer has died it is for the judge to decide whether or 
not he believes the evidence of the estoppel claimant since the assurer cannot 
be questioned about the exact nature of any assurances given. Lord Lloyd 
48 Ibid at para 1 
49 Above n 48 at para 19. 
50 Benmax v Austin Motor Co [1955] AC 370; Biogen Inc v Medeva Inc [1997] RPC 1 
Assicurazioni Generali SA v Arab Insurance Group [2003] 1 WLR 577. 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
185 
                                                     
revisited Thorner v Major and in the light of the House of Lords reversal of 
his judgment in that case commented on the evidence in Cook v Thomas as 
follows: 
 
“I see no indication in the judgment that the judge failed to take 
proper account of any relevant conduct. He looked at the evidence as 
regards the first promise in the light of circumstances as they then 
stood…nothing had been done by then which was relevant in support 
of the Defendant’s case, unlike the history in Thorner v Major… 
where the claimant had been helping the deceased voluntarily for 
years before anything was said to him that could amount to a promise 
or representation.” 
  
COMMENTARY 
 
Proprietary estoppel has been recognised as a doctrine for many centuries. 
As Thompson comments “equitable estoppel is a doctrine of considerable 
antiquity.”51 However the modern requirements as laid down in Taylor 
Fashions52 are very broad and leave much to the court’s discretion. This has 
resulted in a large body of case law surrounding what the court would regard 
as an assurance or representation which could be deemed to give rise to an 
equity in favour of the claimant. Proprietary estoppel had not been 
substantively discussed by the House of Lords since Ramsden v Dyson53so the 
decision was awaited with particular interest and anticipation. Does the 
decision herald a new chapter in the development of proprietary estoppel or 
merely a postscript to what has gone before? 
Thorner v Major was decided on a number of issues, in particular it 
considered how clear an assurance must be in order to found property rights 
and also how clearly must the property itself be described. In relation to the 
assurance each judge in the House of Lords in varying degrees retreated from 
the strict terms set down by Lord Lloyd as to what is needed to constitute a 
“clear and unequivocal assurance.”  Lord Walker relied on the differences that 
exist between promissory estoppel and proprietary estoppel and relying on 
various sources54 showed that there is authority that the “clear and 
unequivocal” test does not apply to proprietary estoppel. However he added 
that “to establish a proprietary estoppel the relevant assurances must be clear 
51  Modern Land Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 4th edn, 2009) p 558. 
52 Above n 11. 
53 (1866) LR 1 HL 129. 
54 Treitel The Law of Contract (London:  Sweet and Maxwell, 12th Edn, 2007); Slade 
LJ in Jones v Watkins (unreported) 26 November 1987; [1987] CA Transcript No 
1200. 
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enough.”55 He added: “What amounts to sufficient clarity, in a case of this 
sort, is hugely dependent on context.”56 Their Lordships comments in relation 
to an assurance were all carefully applied in the subsequent cases described 
above. Each judge was careful to consider whether the words or conduct 
relied upon could constitute an assurance but did not fall into the trap of 
allowing property rights to arise where there was detriment without the 
connection to an assurance. So in Macdonald v Frost no rights arose for the 
daughters who had clearly suffered financial detriment, who had clearly 
believed they had a future right to their father’s estate but could not prove that 
there had been an assurance from their father even within the more flexible 
definition laid down by the House of Lords in Thorner. 
In relation to the description of the property itself there was less difficulty 
in disposing of Lord Lloyd’s hesitancy over allowing a claim where the 
assurance related to “Steart Farm” without any reference to the extent of what 
that meant. As already commented57 Lord Neuberger dealt with this issue as 
follows “In this case, the extent of the farm might change, but, on the Deputy 
Judge’s analysis, there is, as I see it, no doubt as to what was the subject of the 
assurance, namely the farm as it existed from time to time. Accordingly, the 
nature of the interest to be received by David was clear: it was the farm as it 
existed on Peter’s death.”58
There are two real fears for property lawyers post-Thorner. Firstly, the 
greater degree of uncertainty surrounding claims under proprietary estoppel. 
Since an assurance can be made impliedly and the court can infer evidence of 
an assurance of rights from the context it will be very difficult to advise 
whether the context is sufficient for the establishment of rights. Of course 
there are cases prior to Thorner where the claim has been based on an implied 
assurance. Lord Cranworth in Ramsden v Dyson59 makes it quite clear that 
silence in the face of a neighbours encroachment on your land will give rise to 
rights but these cases are quite different. These are cases where property may 
pass where there has never been an express promise or consensus that the 
property will pass. The facts of Thorner itself suggest that this will be strictly 
applied so rights will only pass where the context is clear that the property 
owner always intended the property to pass but never articulated this clearly 
to the claimant. Where this principle begins to unravel is over the question of 
the location of title prior to the death of the owner. Lord Scott highlights this 
difficulty clearly. He considers the question of what would happen if after 
Peter Thorner had impliedly assured David of the farm Peter had then become 
55 Above n 8 at 794 para 56. 
56 Ibid. 
57 See above at n 26. 
58 Above n 8 at 803 para 95. 
59 Above n 50. 
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ill and needed nursing care could the farm be sold and used for his care? If as 
is suggested David now had rights in the farm Peter would not be able to do 
this but Lord Scott suggests that Peter still had sufficient rights in order to 
enforce his rights.  
 
“If, for example, Peter had become, before his death, in need of full 
time nursing care, so that he could not continue to live at Steart Farm 
or continue as a farmer and needed to sell Steart Farm or some part of 
it in order to fund the costs of necessary medical treatment and care, it 
seems to me questionable whether David’s equity in Steart Farm, bred 
from the representations and conduct in evidence in this case would 
have been held by a court to bar the realisation of Steart Farm, or 
some sufficient part of it, for those purposes.” 
 
So what could David be said to own after the implied assurance had been 
made. In the most recent case of Cook v Thomas if the court had found in 
favour of Mr and Mrs Thomas it would have been open for it to have found a 
property right in their favour which would then have been binding on Mrs 
Cook during her lifetime. One of the key responsibilities of a sound property 
law system is to ensure that title to property can be located with a high degree 
of certainty at all times. It should not be open to a claimant X to suggest that 
he owns an interest in property dependent on vague promises and the 
interpretation of events. There is a worrying contrast between the need for 
reliance on formality for the acquisition of property where it is conveyed to 
the purchaser and the disregard of formality in cases of proprietary estoppel. 
Although as a result of Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd60 proprietary 
estoppel can no longer be used as a way to circumvent the need for an 
enforceable contract in the purchase of land other formalities such as the 
requirement of a valid will appear to be approached in a different way. Peter 
Thorner had once made a valid will and he clearly knew that it was a 
necessary formality. Some academics have argued that it is the assurance and 
its effect on the claimant that replaces the formalities of property transfer61. 
Perhaps Lord Lloyd’s strict interpretation of what constitutes an assurance 
was an attempt to rein in the expansion of informal property rights where 
clarity and certainty should be paramount. So in allowing an assurance to be 
based on implication and context the House of Lords have opened the 
possibility of greater uncertainty in acquiring property rights in this way. 
The second fear for property lawyers is the uncertainty surrounding the 
court’s interpretation of the facts. Lord Hoffmann placed great weight on 
60 Above n 6. 
61 M Dixon “Proprietary Estoppel: a Return to Principle?” [2009] Conveyancer and 
Property Lawyer 260. 
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context and this was echoed throughout the other judgments. A very heavy 
onus will now rest on the findings of fact of any Judge at first instance in 
estoppel cases. So much rested on the findings of fact of Mr John Randall QC 
in Thorner v Curtis62. It would seem from the Court of Appeal’s decision in 
Cook v Thomas63 that considerable weight will now be placed on what was 
the judge at first instance’s view of the witnesses and whether the judge finds 
that an assurance has been made. The very long and detailed judgement in 
Macdonald v Frost64 suggests that the judiciary at first instance will now 
evaluate the evidence in great detail in these cases to ensure that the alleged 
assurance is considered in its context. However in a case where the equity of 
the property was valued at approximately £200,000 the thirty-one page 
judgment seemed unnecessarily detailed. There was disquiet in the House of 
Lords that Lord Lloyd had been prepared to reverse the findings of fact of the 
lower court. Lord Neuberger commented that although it would be possible 
for the Court of Appeal to reverse the first instance decision on fact he 
concluded “in a case such as this, where the facts are unusual and the first 
instance judge has made full and careful findings, an appellate court should be 
very slow to intervene.”65  
Is this a new chapter in the development of this doctrine? Clearly over the 
centuries it has played an important role in addressing what the court deems to 
be unconscionable.66 So often the court in proprietary estoppel seeks to 
uphold property rights because it would be unconscionable for the claimant to 
be denied rights67 indeed many would argue that this is the real basis of 
proprietary estoppel68 Laudable as this has always seemed in the context of 
property rights the parameters of the doctrine should have a clearer definition. 
However in seeking clarity it is important that the flexibility of estoppel is not 
lost. 
62 Above n 11. 
63 [2010] EWCA Civ 227. 
64 Above n 32. 
65 Above n 8 at para 81. 
66 See generally H Delany and D Ryan “Unconscionability: a Unifying Theme in 
Equity” [2008] Conveyancer and Property Lawyer  401. 
67 See Jennings v Rice [2002] EWCA Civ 159. “…the essence of the doctrine of 
proprietary estoppel is to do what is necessary to avoid an unconscionable result” 
Robert Walker LJ at para 56. 
68 Above n 69. 
